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Abstract  
We propose a new cryptosystem by combing the Lissajous map, which is the asymptotic 
model of deterministic randomness, with the one-way coupled map lattice (OCML) system. The 
key space, the encryption efficiency, and the security are investigated. We find that the parameter 
sensitivity can reach the computational precision when the system size is only three, all the lattice 
outputs can be treated as key stream parallelly, and the system is resistible against various attacks 
including the differential-like chosen cipher attack. The findings of this paper are a strong 
indication of the importance of deterministic randomness in secure communications. 
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1.  Introduction  
Due to the intrinsic connection to cryptography, chaos represents a good candidate for 
designing cryptosystems, especially since the first description of chaos synchronization by Pecora 
and Carroll [1]. A large number of chaos-based secure communication schemes have been 
proposed in last decade [2-8]. However, most of them are fundamentally flowed by a lack of 
security, and various attacks such as nonlinear forecasting, return map, adaptive parameter 
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estimation, error function attack (EFA), and inverse computation based chosen cipher attack, can 
succeed in extracting the secret keys or recovering the messages encoded by the chaotic waves 
directly [9-13]. Recently, a class of spatiotemporally chaotic systems with high security and 
efficiency by applying some algebraic operations into the one-way coupled map lattice (OCML) 
system has been provided [5-8]. To date the exact mechanism for high security, however, has not 
been revealed yet. In this study, we demonstrate their outstanding features, excellent chaos [14], 
presents fundamentally differences with known chaotic dynamics—directly linked with 
deterministic randomness firstly introduced in Ref. [15], sharing short time unpredictability, 
longer period, and better random properties. In other words, the internal states are transformed 
into a very complex dynamics, i.e., key streams, by non-linear functions with non-invertible 
characteristics such as INT and MOD operations [5-8]. However, we have found that this class of 
cryptosystem still suffers from the problem of degeneration, and the differential-like chosen cipher 
attack (DCCA) can break the prototype of such cryptosystems with ignorable computational costs 
[16]. With the help of our recently proposed Lissajous map: the exact model of asymptotic 
deterministic randomness constructed by the skewed parabola map and non-invertible nonlinear 
transformation [17-18], the current study examines the alternative scenario of cryptosystem under 
such novel nonlinear dynamics in a systematic way. A one-way coupled Lissajous map lattice 
(OCLML) with a delicately designed confusion unit in every lattice is implemented to achieve 
significant enhancement in confusion and diffusion. The key space, the encryption efficiency, and 
the security are investigated in detail. Both the analytical and experimental results show that the 
parameter sensitivity can reach the level of 522− , the computational precision in practice, when 
the system size is only three. The parallel encryption can be realized even in the one-dimensional 
coupling structure. Furthermore, the cryptosystem can resist almost all the existing attacks 
including EFA, DCCA etc.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce deterministic 
randomness. In section 3, we present the OCLML system and investigate its key space and 
encryption efficiency. Security analysis and numerical results are shown in section 4, and some 
concluding remarks are given in section 5.   
 
2.  Deterministic randomness and its asymptotic model 
Here, we provide a brief description of deterministic randomness and its asymptotic models 
(For more details see Ref. [15, 17-20] and references therein). Originally, Gonzalez found that the 
generalization of the solution to the well known logistic map 2sin ( )nnX zθπ= , where z  is a real 
number, can produce short-term unpredictable sequences [15, 19-20]. In order to distinguish from 
chaos, this phenomenon is named as deterministic randomness [20]. The basic concept of 
deterministic randomness is that the next value of the generated sequence cannot be expressed as 
1 1 1( , , , )n n n n rX f X X X+ − − += L , i.e., it is impossible to derive the next value by the previous values. 
Several autonomous systems and real physical systems have been provided to produce similar 
dynamics of asymptotic deterministic randomness [20]. To the best of our knowledge, Lissajous 
map is the first model to exactly describe asymptotic deterministic randomness [17-18].  
Theorem1 Consider 11 ( ( ))n nx f af x−+ = ， /a p q= , 11 1( ( ))n ny f bf x−+ += , when Nb q= and 
2( )Nb pq=  for 2: sinf = , 2: cosf = , : cosf = and : sinf = , respectively. The map of ny  vs. n iy + , 
1,2,i N= L , will be bi-multivalued and represent Lissajous curves, thus name it as Lissajous map 
[17-18]. Furthermore, the sequences produced by Lissajous map are m -steps unpredictable, 
where 1 m N< ≤ , i.e., the next value cannot be expressed by 1 2( , , , )n n n n my f y y y− − −= L . 
Taking the example of 2: sinf = , we can have 2 1sin ( sin ( ))M Nn M ny a q x−+ = , M N< , which 
will be equivalent to 2sin ( )n Mn MX aθπ ++ =  under certain initial conditions. Obviously, when 
b →∞ , Lissajous map can be used to describe deterministic randomness and act as an asymptotic 
model [17-18]. Fig.1 shows the phase space of sequence generated by Lissajous map, which are 
identical to that of sequence produced by 2sin ( )nnX zπθ= . The route from chaos to deterministic 
randomness can be visually described by the bifurcation process of Lissajous map, shown in Fig. 2, 
where 11 sin( sin ( ))n nx u a x−+ = , 11 1sin( sin ( ))n ny b x−+ += with 5/ 2a =  and [0,1]u∈ . It can be found that 
the bifurcation process of Lissajous map can be empirically explained as some “frequency 
modulation transformation” for that of typical chaotic system, and the “instant frequency” is 
1 1 2sin( sin ( )) / 1 ( sin( sin ( ))))n n
p pb x u x
q q
− −− .  
It should be noted that the spatiotemporally chaotic systems proposed in Ref. [5-8] also 
belong to special cases of deterministic randomness generator, in which the output, even some 
hidden state variables, is derived from the internal states by some non-invertible nonlinear 
functions. Meanwhile, it is interesting to find that the deterministic randomness generator is 
directly associated with the counter-assisted generator with provable high security in conventional 
cryptography [21].  
 
3.  Cryptosystem incorporating Lissajous map with OCML  
OCML as a theoretical model of spatiotemporal phenomena has attracted much attention in 
secure communications [5-8]. In comparison with low-dimensional chaos, spatiotemporal chaos is 
much more complex in dynamics. Moreover, there exist many spatial sites, each of which taking 
chaotic motion can be performed parallelly to increase the efficiency of information treatment. 
Therefore, OCML system provides an ideal platform to be equipped with Lissajous map to build a 
cryptosystem with high security and high efficiency. Before presenting our scheme, let us analyze 
the OCML system in term of its Lyapunov spectrum (LS). Explicitly, we consider the following 
OCML of length N  with period boundary condition.        
 1( 1) (1 ) [ ( )] [ ( )]j j jx n f x n f x nε ε −+ = − + , 1, 2,j N= L                                
( ) ( )j j Nx n x n+=                                                          (1) 
In order to calculate the LS, we differentiate the state equation to obtain the evolution equations 
for tangent vectors 1 2( , )
T
Nx x xζ δ δ δ= K , which in matrix form read 1n n nζ ζ+ = T , with the 
Jacobian matrix given by [(1 ) ]ε ε= − +n nT B D , where ' ,( ( ))jkn j j kD F x n δ= , ,( 1) modjk j k NB δ += .  
An important case that can be tacked easily is the one where the lattices are in homogeneous 
state, i.e., *1 2( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( )Nx n x n x n x n= = = = . It can be found that this state can be obtained if we 
choose the initial state as 0 1 2(1) (1) (1) ... (1)Nx x x x= = = = . In other words, the homogeneity of the 
initial conditions is preserved under iterations.    
Due to the homogeneity, we have ' * ˆ[(1 ) ] ( ( ))F x nε ε= − + =n nT B D B , where ˆ (1 )ε ε= − +NB I B .                  
If 1, NΛ ΛL  are the eigenvalues of 1/ 2ˆ lim( ) nn→∞=
T
n nΛ Π Π , where =n n n-1 2 1Π T T T TL , the LS are 
obtained as lnk kλ = Λ , 1, ,k N= L . Therefore, we have the LS as * ln (1 )k u kbλ λ ε ε= + − + , 
where ' *ln ( ( ))u f x nλ =< >  is the Lyapunov exponent (LE) of uncoupled map, and kb  is the 
kth  eigenvalue of B . We notice that B is a circulate matrix, its eigenvalues are given by: 
1
0 1 1
N
j N jc c r c r
−
−+ +L , where exp(2 / )jr ij Nπ=  is an Nth root of unity, and 1 10j
j N
c
otherwise
= −⎧= ⎨⎩ . 
Thus, we can derive the LS of the OCML system as: 
* 2 2 2ln( (1 ) 2 (1 )cos )k u
k
N
πλ λ ε ε ε ε= + − + + −                                       (2) 
The largest LE (LLE) max uλ λ= , which determines the expand rate with the evolution of time, 
is only governed by the uncoupled nonlinear function f . Increasing the coupling size  N  has 
no contribution to enhance the LLE, i.e., only the number of positive LE increases with N, instead 
of the value of the LLE. Therefore, in order to achieve more complex dynamics, the nonlinear 
function f  with better cryptographic properties should be involved in the OCML system.  
In contrast to previous studies based on chaotic systems, we introduce the deterministic 
randomness to the synchronization of OCML. Our aim is to design a new cryptosystem that is 
“truly” secure and most efficient. By this we mean cryptosystem with the property that, when 
evaluating with EFA, the size of key basin is of the order of the computational precision, and 
every state variable can be used to encrypt the message simultaneously. The dynamics of the 
transmitters is shown in Eq. 3. In the new OCML-based cryptosystem, every lattice consists of 
two parts: a coupling unit and a nonlinear transformation unit. The output of every lattice is 
derived from the coupling variables by a non-invertible nonlinear function. It should be noted that 
the output of every lattice can be used to produce key stream for encoding the messages 
simultaneously, which significantly increases the efficiency of encryption.    
1,1 1 1,1 1 0,1( 1) (1 ) ( ( )) ( ( ))x n F x n F x nε ε+ = − +                                          (3a) 
1,2 1 1,1( 1) ( ( 1))x n G x n+ = +                                                      (3b) 
,1 ,1 1,2( 1) (1 ) ( ( )) ( ( ))j j j j jx n F x n F x nε ε −+ = − +                                       (3c) 
,2 ,1( 1) ( ( 1))j j jx n G x n+ = + ， 2,...,j N=                                          (3d) 
,2( ) [int( ( ) 2 )]mod 2n jK j x n
µ γ= ×                                                (3e) 
0,1( ) / 2nx n S
γ=                                                              (3f) 
with 1( ) ( ( ))j jF x f a f x
−= ， 1( ) ( ( ))j jG x f b f x−= ， 2( ) sin ( )f x x= . 
The dynamics of the receiver (denoted by , ( )i jy n , 1,2,...,i N= , 1,2j = ) is identical to that of the 
transmitter except that the first lattice 1,1( )y n  is driven by 0,1 0,1( ) ( )y n x n= .  
In our model we fix 0.99ε = , 522jb = , 1, 2,...,j N= , 3N = , 52µ = , 32γ = , 
2.5, 2,3,...,ja j N= = , and adopt 1a  as the secret key.  
 The transmitted ciphertext has two functions: carry the information of plaintext and drive the 
decrypter to synchronize. When they are synchronized, the decrypter recovers the key stream as 
that generated in the encrypter. From the state equation, we can derive the Jacobian matrix for the 
driven sub-system, which is a trigonometric matrix with trigonometric variables: 
'( ) (1 ) ( )ii i iD F yε= −F , 1,2,...,i N=                                              (4) 
As a result, the conditional LE read:  
iλ = '
1
1ln(1 ) lim ln( ( ( )))
T
i iT t
F y t
T
ε →∞ =− + ∑  
=
1
sin(2 arcsin ( ))1ln(1 ) lim ln
2 ( )(1 ( ))
T
i i i
T t i i
a a y t
T y t y t
ε
→∞ =
− + −∑                                  (5) 
Only when all the conditional LEs are negative, the two sides can achieve stable 
synchronization. From Fig. 3 we can see that when the coupling strength is strong, the secret key 
can be selected in a wide range, making the whole system synchronize. Therefore, in our model, 
the key space is defined as 1 [2.5,100]a ∈ . But for rapid as well as stable synchronization, the 
selection of 1a  should make the largest conditional LE far away for the zero point. 
A crucial condition for the multi-channel communications is that any two outputs serving as 
the key stream from different transmission channel should be unrelated each other. Given two 
sequences ( )iH N  and ( )jH N , the normalized auto-correlation and cross-correlation are, 
respectively, defined as follows:  
 1
2
1
[ ( ) ][ ( ) ]
( )
[ ( ) ]
T i i i i
l
ii T i i
l
H l H H l H
C
H l H
ττ =
=
− + −= −
∑
∑  
1
2
1
[ ( ) ][ ( ) ]
( )
[ ( ) ]
T i i j j
l
ij T i i
l
H l H H l H
C
H l H
ττ =
=
− + −= −
∑
∑                                        (6) 
where H  is the average of ( )H l  in T  iterations. 
In Fig. 4a, we plot the cross-correlation of the key stream produced by two adjacent sites of 
the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. [5]. It can be found that there exists strong correlation between 
key streams, which cannot be simultaneously treated to encode the messages. In comparison, we 
plot in Fig. 4a the cross-correlation of the key stream generated by our scheme, from which we 
can see that the key stream generated from different sites is practically unrelated in the sense that 
their cross-correlation value is equivalent to that of two sequences uniformly distributed in [0,1] . 
This property of cross-correlation is quite desirable to ensure security and overcome the 
interferences in a multi-channel communication environment.      
 
4.  Security analysis and numerical simulation  
With the requirement of public-structure and chosen-cipher, EFA can be used for evaluating 
the system’s key sensitivity [12].  
 1
1
1( )
2
T
n nv
n
e b I I
T =
′= −∑                                                       (7) 
where nI ′  can be computed by the intruder from the receiver with designed ciphertext nS  
and the test key 1b . Since the test key, which is close enough to the true secret key, can still 
synchronize the receiver to a certain extent, thus forming a key basin around the secret key.  
In Fig.5a, we plot the EFA result of the model suggested in Ref. [5] with respect to the test 
key mismatch. We find that the width of the smooth basin around the secret key is to the level of 
710− . Once the location of the key basin is found, the attack can implement an optimal searching 
method to derive the actual secret key. As a comparison, we also plot in Fig.5b the EFA result of 
our system. It can be found that the width of the key basin is of the same order of the 
computational precision 1610− . Moreover, away from the basin, the error function ( ) 1/3e b ≈ , 
practically similar to the average error between two completely random data sequences which are 
uniformly distributed in [0,1], just with a small fluctuation. So, it is impossible for the intruder to 
find the tendency toward the position of the key by certain optimal searching methods. Meanwhile, 
we plot the plaintext recovery in Fig. 6, from which we can see that even when there is a 
mismatch in the secret key of 512− , the plaintext recovery will fail. Therefore, the proposed 
scheme possesses much better security against the EFA, i.e., the key sensitivity has been increased 
significantly.  
In Ref. [16], we introduced differential mechanism into the constant-driving chosen-cipher 
attack, and suggested the DCCA, which can break the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. [5]. By using 
DCCA, we use a constant driving dy  to make the chaotic system converge, and after 
convergence, we perturb the constant driving slightly. If we take the key stream before and after 
the perturbation as K and 'K  respectively, we can construct a perturbation function 
'( , )dg b y K K= − , which represents the difference before and after the convergence in term of the 
secret key and the driving. The vulnerability of the system proposed in Ref. [5] is due to the fact 
that when the driving is properly selected, the perturbation function is simple structured and 
slowly changing [16]. Thus, some optimal searching methods based on the perturbation function 
can be implemented to search the actual secret key. Now we analyze the security of our proposed 
system under such DCCA. The key point is to analyze the complexity of the perturbation function, 
which can be characterized by the number of zero-crossing points. We take 1 0,1( ( ))F x n  as the 
equivalent driving, i.e., 1 0,1( ( ))dx F x n= . It can be easily proved that driven by a constant signal, 
all the state variables will converge to certain fix points, i.e., all the state variables are independent 
with time index after convergence. Therefore, the state equations after the perturbation can be 
shown as follows. 
1,1
'
1 1,1(1 ) ( ) ( )dx F x xε ε τ= − + +                                                   (8a) 
1,2 1,1
' '
1 ( )x G x=                                                                (8b) 
,1 1,2
' '
,1(1 ) ( ) ( )j jj j jx F x F xε ε −= − +                                                  (8c) 
,2 ,1
' '( )
j jj
x G x= ， 2...j N=                                                       (8d) 
Therefore, the difference dynamics becomes: 
1,1
'
1,1 1,1e x x ετ= − = , 1,2' '1,2 1,2 1 1,1 1 1,1( ) ( )e x x G x G x= − = −                                (9a) 
'
,1 1,2 1,2[ ( ) ( )]j j j j je F x F xε − −= − , ',2 ,1 ,1( ) ( )j j j j je G x G x= −                               (9b) 
As the perturbation is extremely slight, 
,
' 2
,( ) 0i j i jx x− =  in practical calculation, we have 
1,1e ετ= , '1,2 1 1 1,1( )e G eξ=                                                     (10a) 
'
,1 1,2( )j j j je F eε ς −= , ',2 ,1( )j j j je G eξ= , 2,3, ,j N= L                                (10b) 
where ' ',1 ,1 ,1 ,1(min( , ), max( , ))j j j j jx x x xς ∈  
' '
,2 ,2 ,2 ,2(min( , ),max( , ))j j j j jx x x xξ ∈ , 1,2, ,j N= L  
Consequently, we obtain the perturbation function  
' '
,2
1 2
( , ) 2 ( ( ) ( )) 2
j j
N N
N
d N j j
j j
g b y e G Fµ µξ ς ε τ
= =
= = ∏ ∏                                 (11) 
Since '
sin(2 arcsin )
( )
2 (1 )j
j ja a xF x
x x
= − , 
' sin(2 arcsin )( )
2 (1 )j
j jb b xG x
x x
= − , which, respectively, has 
1ja⎢ ⎥ +⎣ ⎦ and 1jb⎢ ⎥ +⎣ ⎦  zero-crossing points. We can roughly calculate the number of zero-crossing 
points of the perturbation function as 54[( 1)( 1)] 2N Nj jb a⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ + ≈⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . We can see that even when 
1N = , the number of zero-crossing points is extremely large. Therefore, by using the perturbation 
function, the attacker still find it extremely difficult to construct an optimal searching method to 
search the secret key. In comparison with the results in Ref. [16], we plot the in Fig.7 the 
converged state with driving around 0.495. We see that even in the interval with 1010−  width, the 
function is extremely rapid changing. It indicates that the structure of the perturbation function is 
quite complex. Therefore, the resistance of our proposed scheme to the DCCA has been increased 
dramatically.   
 
5.  Conclusion  
In summary, we investigate the deterministic randomness and its asymptotic model Lissajous 
map. A new cryptosystem incorporating Lissajous map with OCML has been proposed, which 
combines the features of deterministic randomness and spatiotemporal phenomenon. The security 
and encryption efficiency are also investigated. Results show that the parameter sensitivity can 
reach the level of 522− , the computational precision in practice, when the system size is only three. 
The parallel encryption is possible even in the one-dimensional coupling structure. Furthermore, 
the proposed system has excellent resistance against various attacks including the differential-like 
chosen cipher attack suggested recently. The findings of this paper indicate that the deterministic 
randomness and its asymptotic model are of great importance for applying in secure 
communications, and may be extended to other scenarios such as stream cipher and public key 
cryptography.     
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Captions of Figures 
Fig.1 First return map of the sequence produced by Lissajous map with 5/ 2a =  (a) 2: sinf =   
(b) : sinf = (c) 2: cosf =  (d) : cosf = . 
Fig.2 (a) “ x  distribution- u ” bifurcation figures (b) “ y  distribution- u ” bifurcation figures. 
Fig.3 (a) Synchronization zone (b) conditional LE vs. coupling strength. 
Fig.4 Length of key stream is taken as 32 10L = × . (a) cross-correlation of the key stream 
generated by 24th and 25th lattice of the cryptosystem proposed in Ref. [5]. (b) cross-correlation of 
the key stream generated by 2nd and 3rd lattice of our proposed cryptosystem.  
Fig. 5 The EFA result (a) system proposed in Ref. [5] (b) Our proposed scheme. 
Fig. 6 Plaintext recovery. The first 1000 data have been discarded. (a) The plaintext (b) The 
cipher (c) The recovered plaintext by using 1 2.5b = (d) The recovered plaintext by using 
51
1 2.5 2b
−= − . 
Fig.7 The converged state vs. driving. (a) [0,1]dy ∈  (b) 10[0.495,0.495 10 ]dy −∈ + .  
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